We used decision analysis to define requirements for the US Marine Corps' mobile protected weapons system during the concept selection phase of the systems acquisition process; to analyze the mix of air defense weapons for the forward area air defense of the US Army during the demonstration and validation phase; to assist in the evaluation by the US Army and the Marine Corps of competing proposals for the light armored vehicle in the full-scale development phase; to determine which service (Army or Air Force) should be the proponent for the PATRIOT missile system in the production and fielding phase; and to provide cost-benefit priorities of projects to the Marine Corps in the program objectives memorandum process, which allocates resources throughout the systems acquisition cycle.
Ch 26 060520 V07 analysis can be used to allocate resources as part of the program objectives memorandum (POM). Table 26 .1 identifies the selected decision analyses that we are presenting for each of the above defined phases. We are not describing any analyses in the Technology Development Phase because this is a relatively new idea and our analyses in this area are not centered on the focus of the phase. The appendix identifies many of the analyses in which we have participated. 
Concept Selection Phase: USMC Mobile Protected Weapons System
In 1980, we used decision analysis to define the requirements for a proposed new program called the mobile protected weapons system (MPWS), which the US Marine Corps was considering. The MPWS concept called for a helicopter-transportable, armored vehicle with either a gun or missile system to provide direct fire support during defensive operations, during a beach landing, and during subsequent movements ashore toward their objective. At this time, the Department of Defense (DOD) emphasized requirements that Ch 26 060520 V07 were tailored to high-level performance capabilities needed to complete missions in specific scenarios rather than the detailed specification of particular system hardware. For example, rather than a requirement asking for six inches of rolled homogeneous armor, the requirement would demand that the armor stop the penetration of a 14.5 mm shell at 2,000 meters. The Marine Corps' personnel were wrestling with strongly conflicting requirements that the vehicle be transportable by large helicopters and be mobile on the ground, yet survivable (that is, protected by armor) and lethal. The firepower envisioned for MPWS was an anti-tank gun or missile system.
During a three-month period, we developed a multiattribute value analysis to define MPWS minimum capabilities and the weighted trade-offs Buede, 1981, 1982) . Twenty-three marines and government civilian engineers contributed their specialized expertise to develop an attribute hierarchy, value curves, and value weights for this multiattribute analysis. We first developed a draft structure, value curves, and weights with about 10 principal experts from the Marine Corps Headquarters and the Development and Education Center. Then we invited subsets of the rest of participants to working meetings to critique specific portions of the analysis. Finally, after contractors developed conceptual MPWS designs, we evaluated these designs with the multiattribute value structure; then we compared these evaluations to the intuitive valuations of the principal experts. There were several discrepancies between the analysis and the intuitive valuation.
We resolved these discrepancies in conference sessions and adjusted selected value weights and curves. We then documented this analysis and it was distributed to industry as part of the government's request for proposal (RFP). Ch 26 060520 V07 Figure 26 .1 shows the final multiattribute value structure for MPWS operational effectiveness. The highest level of the hierarchy describes three scenarios which reflect the spectrum of Marine Corps' actions during combat: support in assaulting forces during an amphibious landing, establishing positions to block oncoming forces during defensive stages, and conducting offensive operations to achieve objectives subsequent to the successful completion of an amphibious landing. Different geographic regions were chosen as representative of each of these scenarios to reflect the highest payoff environments for the MPWS. The weights for the scenarios reflected both the relative likelihood of occurrence and the relative contribution of the MPWS to each scenario. Weights everywhere else in the hierarchy are "swing weights"; that is, the weights capture the importance of an attribute, and the importance of the swing from lowest to highest capability represented by the value curves. We elicited and refined a total of 34 value curves for the scenarios, one for each performance parameter. Typically the weights of the attributes varied across the scenarios. We defined most of the value curves on continuous performance parameters; however, we had to define a few parameters, such as mobility in water, discretely (for example, ford, swim [aided] , swim [unaided] , and surf). Most of the value curves exhibited decreasing returns to scale, but there were a few S-shaped curves as well, (see Watson and Buede, 1987) for definitions of these properties of value curves). A particular MPWS design would be evaluated on each performance parameter in terms of its most likely capability; these evaluations would be done either subjectively or with the use of simulation models. For each curve, the parameter estimate would be entered on the xaxis and the resulting value for that performance attribute would be found on the y-axis by Ch 26 060520 V07 finding the appropriate (x, y) point on the value curve. These attribute values were then combined using an additive, weighted value function. Ch 26 060520 V07 Figure 26 .1 The mobile protected weapon system (MPWS) multiattribute value system includes three scenarios within an amphibious landing and a wide range of performance criteria that apply to each scenario. Ch 26 060520 V07 Table 26 .2 illustrates how the high-level attribute weights varied as a function of the three scenarios. We developed similar tables for each node in the multiattribute tree. requirements definition process, every one of the 10 conceptual designs submitted was outstanding.
The Marine Corps capitalized on the strengths of decision analysis to bring together the best mix of users, developers, engineers, and tacticians to resolve the complex tradeoffs inherent in defining weapons systems requirements.
Concept Refinement Phase: Air Defense Weapons-Mix Analysis
In 1988, the US Army air defense community was wrestling with the problem of developing the most cost-effective mix of low-altitude air defense weapons. We were asked to compare and rank order alternate weapons mixes for the forward area air defense system (FAADS). In a two-phased approach, we (1) convened a panel of experts to develop a hierarchy of evaluation criteria, define forward area air defense system weapons mixes, score the alternatives on the evaluation criteria, prioritize the evaluation criteria, and analyze the results; and (2) convened a larger, more senior panel of officers to review and modify the results. A quantitative framework (multiattribute utility analysis) captured qualitative judgments, and to the extent possible, incorporated previous simulations and studies.
The 1988 focus of this analysis was on the predicted 1996 threat in central Europe,
during the first few days of a war with the Warsaw Pact (Bresnick, O'Connor, Marvin, and Rausch, 1989) . The emphasis was on a forward area air defense system battalion that is organic to mechanized or armored Army divisions. We evaluated six alternate mixes, ranging from the current short-range air defense systems (the product improved Vulcan air defense system (PIVADS), Chaparral, and the Stinger man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) to a mix of 36 line-of-sight, forward heavy (LOS-F-H), 18 non-line-of-sight Ch 26 060520 V07
(NLOS), and 36 line-of-sight, rear (LOS-R) weapons. The LOS-F-H was to be the air defense antitank system (ADATS), the NLOS was the fiber optic guided missile (FOG-M), and the LOS-R was the pedestal mounted Stinger (PMS). We developed an evaluation hierarchy (Figure 26 .2) and scored each alternative on a relative basis on each criterion at the lowest level of the hierarchy. We assigned weights to the criteria that reflected both the importance of the criteria and the difference in capability among the alternatives ("swing" weights). Only rough estimates were available for costs.
Of the criteria at the bottom level of the hierarchy, those that provided the most significant discrimination among alternatives are shown with an asterisk (*) in Figure   26 .2. These 10 criteria out of the 27 for operational effectiveness accounted for almost 80 percent of the evaluation differences. From an analysis perspective, this effort was unique in that typically, an air defense study uses only air defense experts. In this effort, we used decision conferencing, a process described in Watson and Buede [1987] , to enable the appropriate combat arms (that is, Note the change in emphasis in Figure 26 .4 from the MPWS. In this new structure, we defined attributes for performance characteristics that can be measured in tests. In developing a new system, the initial choice of contractor is usually based on paper analyses and limited prototype testing, so the attributes have to be less specific. Because the gun system was going to be furnished by the government to the winning contractor, emphasis on the importance of Firepower decreased to reflect small differences among alternatives.
In addition to the criteria shown in Figure 26 .4, we developed two other sets of evaluation factors: a similar hierarchy for a variant of the light armored vehicle that would carry an assault gun and a hierarchy for the production capability of the contractor. This second hierarchy included such items as the ability to maintain schedule, the adequacy of the quality assurance program, the quality of existing designs and the availability of several variants (command and control, logistics, mortar, engineer, ambulance, and so forth), the adequacy of logistics support, and the quality of their project management. The production hierarchy was important since it includes factors that indicate the ability of a contractor to produce the required systems.
Ten contractors submitted proposals, and the government selected four based upon the scores of the analysis. Analytically, there was a clear discrimination in scoring between these top four winners and the remaining six. In this evaluation, the source selection evaluation board used the computer-based analysis to brief the source selection authority on its recommendations. The four winners were then asked to make improvements to their systems and to submit prototypes for a final source selection that was performed by the US Army Tank and Automotive Command based on test results using the prototypes.
Production and Fielding Phase: Joint Services Weapon Proponency Analysis
In 1985, the Office of the Secretary of Defense asked the Army and the Air Force to participate in a joint-service initiative and decide which service should be the proponent for the PATRIOT missile system. The PATRIOT is a mobile, conventional surface-to-air missile designed to protect military forces from attack by medium-to-high altitude aircraft. It is part of the air defense umbrella that includes, among other things, low-altitude air defense missiles and guns and fighter aircraft. At the time of the study, the Army was the service designated to field, operate, and maintain the PATRIOT systems. The question was whether the Air Force might accomplish the PATRIOT portion of the air defense mission more efficiently and effectively than the Army. The purpose of the decision analysis was to determine the feasibility and the desirability of transferring proponency of the PATRIOT missile system from the Army to the Air Force.
Joint decision making involving multiple Services is always difficult. Not only must decisions be supported by sound analysis, but political, bureaucratic, and Service rivalries must be resolved. As a result, many analytic models that are technically correct still fail. In this application, both technical and organizational problems were considered to produce a multiattribute utility analysis that was used to support a decision at the highest level of the two services.
The multiattribute utility analysis included issues about the transfer of PATRIOT and the functions that PATRIOT must perform in the combat environment, called the Air- Although the analysis was not especially complex, it was complicated by several factors.
First was the time constraint. The entire process, including the analysis and its approval, had to be completed within one month. Second was the approval process itself. Each part of the analysis had to be approved by numerous layers of bureaucracy, and the final result required consensus between the Army and the Air Force. Third were the limited resources available for the study. Some specific complications were following:
First, for the study to be successful, a Memorandum of Understanding had to be agreed upon by a joint-service working group that represented at least eight Army and Air Force constituencies. These included the communities that operate the system, develop tactics and doctrine, provide training, and perform studies and analyses. In addition, many other communities had to concur with the decision as it moved toward the decision-making levels of the organization (Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, both four-star Generals).
The decision analysts were responsible for building this consensus. Part of our approach was to use "decision conferences" to bring together staff experts, field officers and decision analysts.
Second, in most studies, the decision analyst and the client can agree on a methodology early in the study and then proceed. In this effort the methodology was subjected to the "wicket test." That is, the methodology had to pass through a nested set of wickets as it was briefed throughout the hierarchy of the organization, with each level imposing its own modifications and special concerns. The pathway to acceptance included:
the joint working group level, the lieutenant colonels, who would organize the effort for each service; the air defense senior officers, major generals for each service; the general officer Ch 26 060520 V07 steering committee, composed of approximately 12 brigadier, major, and lieutenant generals from both services; and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, who were the decision makers.
Third, the "old school," large-scale simulation advocates were very critical. They were uncomfortable with subjective utility assessments and what they considered "touchyfeely" problem solving.
We used two methods to overcome these difficulties. First, for a related part of the study, another group ran a large-scale combat simulation in parallel with the decision conference. It was clear to the working group that (1) the conclusions of both efforts were similar, (2) the decision-conferencing analysis was easier to understand and defend, and (3) the simulation was more time-consuming and cost an order of magnitude more. Second, as a cross-check on the analysis, a panel of retired military air defense experts examined the decision-analytic approach and provided input, advice, and feedback each step of the way.
The study determined that it was feasible to transfer proponency of the PATRIOT from the Army to the Air Force, but that it was not advisable. No significant gains in operational effectiveness would be realized, and it would cost more than $1 billion. Based on the study, the decision that the Army retain responsibility for PATRIOT was implemented via a memorandum signed by the chiefs of staff of the Army and Air Force.
The unique feature of this analysis centered on breaking down the Service parochialism and getting the group to think in terms of the good of the joint effort rather than the individual services. Clearly the Army participants came into the session "wearing their green hats," while the Air Force "wore their blue hats." By the close of the session, participants were "wearing purple (joint-service) hats" and operating as a unified team. Ch 26 060520 V07
Another challenging facet was the need to build ownership of the study among a very large spectrum of sometimes competing advocates. The decision-conferencing approach worked well to solve this problem.
Operations and Support Phase: Airborne and Space-Borne Reconnaissance Force Mixes
We conducted an analysis (as part of a large team of contractors that included analysts and subject matter experts) initiated by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Decision analysis techniques, to include Multiattribute Value
Analysis and Cost-Benefit Analysis, were used to develop a methodology for the evaluation of alternate reconnaissance force mixes (Bresnick et al., 1997) .
Given the importance of joint reconnaissance to today's operational commanders and increasing reliance on reconnaissance for the future, the JROC recognized in 1995 that it had inadequate means to make force mix decisions in terms of end-to-end platform capability and cost across all components: manned aircraft, unmanned aircraft, and overhead systems (satellites). To fulfill this need, the JROC created the Reconnaissance Study Group (RSG) and tasked it to develop and implement a process for making timely and informed reconnaissance force mix decisions.
This analysis was an innovative methodology for determining the composition of promising reconnaissance architectures at various levels of investment for the 2010 time frame. The unique aspects of the approach are its broad scope and scalability in addressing the multiple components of the architecture, the use of value assessments based upon simulations as well as Ch 26 060520 V07 subjective expert judgment to provide traceability and repeatability, and its treatment of cost as an independent variable (Rush, 1997) in the cost-benefit analysis of future force mix options.
The JROC requested that the Reconnaissance Study Group focus on future requirements and capabilities in a time frame no earlier than 2005. The JROC was particularly interested in the effort to define criteria and metrics for force structure discrimination and evaluation. In accordance with the JROC's guidance, the following parameters were agreed upon:
• The scope of the analysis would include unmanned, manned, and overhead reconnaissance collection platforms as well as exploitation and dissemination systems.
• All military tasks to which reconnaissance systems contribute would be considered, not just two Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs).
• The 2010 time frame would be used for both requirements and available capabilities and technologies.
• A set of possible reconnaissance force mixes would be developed with sufficient breadth to enable robust insight into possible budget cuts.
• Unlike most reconnaissance studies, this analysis would be scenario-independent.
• The analysis would have an operational focus with reconnaissance requirements being generated by users (Unified Commands, Services, and Joint Staff representatives)
• Cost and benefit to the user would both be independent variables in the analysis; lower cost solutions for reconnaissance force mixes would be of particular interest.
The three major objectives of the analysis were:
• Establish an initial capability to assess force mix trades.
• Develop a decision support method that provided benefit and cost comparisons of reconnaissance systems in terms of the overall satisfaction of requirements. Ch 26 060520 V07
• Provide promising, candidate force mixes that could be subjected to further analysis of different types, including detailed modeling and simulation in specific scenarios.
Finally, there were four critical issues in the design of the analysis that had to be resolved: First, how should the architecture building blocks for reconnaissance force mixes be designed so that both creative and exhaustive sets of force mixes could be defined and analyzed in a reasonable amount of time? Second, how should modeling be used to aggregate concepts in appropriate places in order to achieve 80% of the desired effect (e.g., precision, accuracy) with only 20% of the mathematical detail? Third, how and from whom should the judgmental inputs be obtained so that they were considered valid? and (4) how should the results be presented so that they are meaningful to the decision makers?
This study developed an analytic process and preliminary analysis recommendations. This summary focuses on the analysis process because the results are classified and were not ends in themselves but have been fed into other decision making process. The detailed results are contained in a classified report.
The analysis process, consisting of the six steps as shown in Figure 26 .6, was briefed to the JROC prior to the study and approved by them for implementation. The Reconnaissance Study
Group monitored the study and approved the study's activities at every step. The six steps in The requirements criteria are shown in Figure 26 .7. The numbers reflect the relative importance of improving the reconnaissance performance from minimum acceptable to desired in each task; all of the relative swings in importance at the task level sum to 100. For example, performance was given 80% of the weight; the 80% was allocated as almost 10% to peacetime engagement, almost 31% to deterrence and conflict prevention, and slightly more than 39% to fight and win the joint conflict. The decimal points are an artifact of the normalization process and are not intended to show undo precision in the weighting process, which was the consensus judgment of representatives from each Commander-in-Chief (CINC) during a three-day decision conference. Figure 26 .8 A portion of the criteria hierarchy with value curves for specific intelligence functions and associated metrics.
For this effort, an architecture refers to a system of systems; in this particular case, to a system of airborne and space-borne reconnaissance platforms, each platform being comprised of one or more systems. Figure 26 .9 illustrates how the reconnaissance components were configured for this analysis to represent an overall system-of-systems architecture. For each component (row), the lettered blocks represent alternate packages (referred to as levels) for the row. Architecture is defined by selecting one package (level) for each row. Each component Ch 26 060520 V07 package depicted in Figure 26 .9 included "end-to-end" systems (including processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems) as well as the front-end system required to task reconnaissance systems and deliver "products" to users. Each of the packages, i.e., each cell in Figure 26 .9, is itself a combination of specific reconnaissance platforms in varying configurations and quantities; each of which was evaluated in terms of costs and value (using the value curves and hierarchies shown in Figures 26.7 and 26.8) . Each platform contains the requisite systems needed to complete its missions. The cost and benefit analyses were complex. The cost analysis addressed a 20-year period of the life of each of the systems, including retirement costs for ending systems. The benefit (or value) analysis was also complex, involving some probabilistic assessments and rules of thumbs for how each platform might be used on average in combination with other platforms. Ch 26 060520 V07
Once a cost and a benefit measure was determined for each level of each architectural component, a benefit/cost analysis using a Pareto-optimal, efficient frontier approach was completed to determine the best allocation of resources across all components. Commercial offthe-shelf software called EQUITY was used to develop a "1" to "n" list that achieves the most bang-for-the-buck at increasing Life Cycle Cost (LCC) points. See Watson and Buede (1987) for a discussion of this approach and Kirkwood (1997) for a more general discussion of this topic.
The major assumption made here is that both the cost and benefits associated with a given component were independent of the packages chosen on other components.
This analytical approach focuses on finding the architectures along the top of the "football"; the convex hull of the "efficient frontier" (Figure 26 .10). This establishes the best order-of-buy of packages in the architectural components. There were 54 different optimal increments out of the more than 288,000 possible architectures. On the basis of this optimal order we plotted the total LCC and benefit of each of the 54 optimal architectures on the convex hull of the Paretooptimal, or efficient, frontier. Decision makers refer to it as the top of the football. Note that this analysis process did not compute all of the Pareto optimal architectures that fell between each pair of points on the convex hull. The purpose of this analysis was not to determine the optimal way to spend a pre-defined amount of money, but rather to provide insight into the sets of packages that were near the optimal allocation of life cycle cost during the timeframe of the study. Ch 26 060520 V07 Figure 26 .10 The convex hull of the efficient frontier, with three key stopping points that were addressed by the decision maker.
The analysis process integrates subject matter experts (system operators and information users), quantitative data, qualitative judgments, and tools into a structured and orderly process to provide timely and meaningful insight and trends to senior decision makers on the relative costs and benefits of reconnaissance alternate architectures.
Linking Systems Acquisition to PPBS: Resourcing the Systems
Throughout all phases of the systems acquisition process, funds must be programmed for the complete procurement of each approved system. Programming for fiscal resources is done in different ways within the DoD, as part of the program objectives memorandum (POM) or a five-year resource allocation process. The DoD, the Navy, the Army, the Air Force and the Marine Corps all use somewhat different approaches. As of 1990 the DoD and the Navy both Ch 26 060520 V07 divide the pot and tell each subelement how much money they are likely to receive and then ask for a detailed list of what will be funded within that budget, and two small lists of what might be funded with a little more or unfunded with a little less. The Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps ask their subelements to create prioritized lists of projects after allocating some predefined amount of money to what are called "core programs"; that is, those programs and segments of programs that will not be questioned during the final decisionmaking process. Then the prioritized lists from each subelement are merged, yielding an organizational priority list. Then a budget line is drawn to match the available resources to the cumulative resource requirements of the list. Funding for each subelement is determined by the number of its projects that can be funded within the total funding available, that is, the number of projects above the funding line.
In early 1977, the Marine Corps requested some analytic support in this area from the DOD's Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA). That support, funded by the Marine Corps after the second year, continues today, more than 28 years later. The problem posed by the Marine Corps in 1977 was that they had to produce a merged priority list of about 100 projects to support decision makers. However, two-and three-star General Officers made the actual decisions in high-level sessions without always using this list or even having it available. Usually, these decisions had to be revised many times over a two-month period because the amount of money allocated to the Marine Corps fluctuated frequently as the POM deadline neared in April of each year. These constant revisions within the Marine Corps led to much frustration among the participants. There was also legitimate concern that projects were often cut in inconsistent ways, typically with inefficient across-the-board cuts. Ch 26 060520 V07
The approach implemented by the first author and used and improved by others since (Kuskey, Waslov, and Buede 1981) involved meeting with each subelement (called sponsors in the Marine Corps) to develop a ratio benefit scale for all the projects and segments of projects that were being considered for funding in the POM process and were within the purview of that sponsor. The analytical concept, which has proven successful, is to use a ratio scale for each sponsor to merge the project priorities across sponsors. Since the meaning of a ratio scale is that multiplication or division by a constant is the only change to the scale that keeps its meaning intact, the sponsors' scales could be merged simply by finding a ratio scale across a subset of the projects, one from each sponsor. Then a costbenefit priority list is created by dividing the five-year cost estimates available for each project into its finalized benefit and then sorting the projects from highest to lowest benefit divided by cost.
The Marine Corps had a process in place for determining what conditions had to be met for a project (or segment of a project) to be considered for funding. Each sponsor was responsible for gathering descriptions and documentation for these projects from program managers within the Marine Corps. We worked with them to ensure that the projects were independent of each other. We developed the ratio scale for each sponsor during several meetings with representatives from the sponsor's office. Section 7.5.4 of Watson and Buede (1987) describes the process for eliciting this ratio scale of benefits.
To merge scales across sponsors, we obtained three ratio scale judgments rather than the one that is required, this introduced redundancies in the judgment process. These redundancies are critical for several reasons. First, comparisons across sponsor projects are much more difficult than those within a sponsor's projects; the group of "honest-brokers" that Ch 26 060520 V07 was convened for these judgments had to compare the relative needs of the Marine Corps for combat-related systems such as radios, trucks, air-defense radars, howitzers, tanks, and water purification equipment with quality-of-life expenditures such as family housing and child care centers. Second, the redundancies could be used to check for agreement or disagreement between the judgments of the sponsors and "honest-brokers." Experience suggested that the sponsors had to be motivated to give truthful judgments. This process comes as close to providing that motivation as any known (Brown et al., 1992) .
After the first analysis, the sponsors strongly supported the resulting benefit scale across the projects of all sponsors. However, several sponsors rejected the cost-benefit priority order on the basis that the cost estimates unfairly penalized some important projects. First, the five-year time horizon did not adequately reflect the true cost for many of the projects.
Also, not all sponsors used the same procedures for developing the cost estimates. During the next several years of POM preparation, improvements were made in the cost-estimating procedures, until finally the cost-benefit priorities were generally accepted. By the 10th year of this support, the cost-benefit priority list was accepted with few ad hoc modifications.
A major impact of this analysis process was the formalization of the "honest-brokers" into an organizational element called the program evaluation group (PEG). The PEG assumed organizational responsibilities for some cross-sponsor issues besides the resource allocation problem. For most organizations this is an area of general weakness, since upper level management rarely has the time to deal with all the organizational issues. While the group's name and location have since changed as the process evolved, its basic function of "honest brokering" remains. Ch 26 060520 V07
The acceptance of the process and the cost-benefit list noticeably improved the efficiency of the Marine Corps' expenditures. The cost-benefit list represents the convex hull of the set of optimal allocations, as can be demonstrated with H. Everett's method of the generalized Lagrange multiplier (1963) .
The process has been continuously improved since its initiation in 1977. The Marine Corps has institutionalized the process, and it has evolved to become a highly effective part of the PPBS process.
Conclusion
These applications of decision analysis are representative of its extensive use over the past 29 years to support DOD acquisition. (See the appendix for a partial list of other projects.)
These analyses have proven to be insightful to the decision makers involved, both in terms of how critical concepts affect decisions and how military organizations can make maximum use of their expertise. Multiattribute value analysis and resource allocation techniques have been the most useful techniques in these applications.
The studies we conducted make some special contributions:
• An explicit format for capturing and representing the trade-off requirements of users for system development;
• Incorporation of the quantitative judgments of all relevant users;
• Computerized analysis in real-time to support high-level and complex decisions;
• A model to depoliticize issues involving multiple organizations; and
• Benefit and cost factors to institutionalize an analytic process to integrate and prioritize projects.
Despite these successes, significant barriers still must be overcome before the use of decision analysis in systems acquisition becomes even more widespread. These barriers include a distrust of analysts outside the military community and a "not-invented-here" syndrome for new analytical approaches. As successful applications of decision analysis become more numerous, these barriers should fall. Ch 26 060520 V07
APPENDIX: Successful Decision Analysis Applications to the Acquisition of Major Defense Systems
Note that there have been changes made to the acquisition phases within the Department of Defense every two to five years since 1971. Some of these changes have had major impacts; others relatively minor impacts. The phases that were used in this chapter were the latest phases as of August, 2005 . The phases we are using in this appendix are more similar to those being used in the 1980s when most of these applications occurred. 
Concept Selection Phase

Production and Deployment
-Joint-service proponency study for the PATRIOT missile system, -Joint-service weapons mix study for PATRIOT missiles and fighter aircraft. 
Operations and Support Phase
